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NOTES
"TIME OF WAR" AND THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
The interpretation of the words "time of war" has been litigated
in many different contexts with far-reaching effects. In civil litigation,
a determination that a period is a time of war can control the validity of
insurance claims,' trig&r certain other benefits,' and suspend statute-
of limitation.' Under military law, its existence can make acts criminal
which were not so before,' cause some offenses to be punishable by death,5
and toll the statutes of limitation for certain crimes.' In addition, the
existence .of a time of war can increase the control of -the military over
civilians,' and, potentially, suspend the judicial system and rights pro-
tected under the constitution.'
1. Stinson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 167 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (World
War II); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion, 158 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1946) (World
War II); Stanbery v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.. 26 N.J. Super. 498, 98 A.2d 134 (1953)
(Korea); Pyramid Life Ins. Co. v. Masch, 134 Colo. 70, 299 P2d 117 (1956) (Korea);
Hammond v. Nat'l Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 243 So. 2d 902 (La. App.), cert. denied, 258
La. 347, 246 So. 2d 196 (1971) (Vietnam); Jackson v. North Am. Assur. Soc'y, 212
Va. 177, 183 S.E.2d 160 (1971) (Vietnam).
2. Thomas v. United States, 39 Ct. Cl. 1 (1903) (pay allowance duringe time
of war) ; Scott v. Commissioner of Civil Service, 272 Mass. 237, 172 N.E. 218 (1930)
(civil service job preference); Bashwiner v. Police & Firemen's Retirement Sys., 68
N.J. Super. 1, 171 A.2d 331 (1961) (veteran's preference for retirement benefits);
Bateman v. Marsh, 188 Misc. 189, 64 N.Y.S.2d 678 (Sup. Ct. 1946) (civil service job
preference).
3. Feil v. Senisi, 7 N.J. Super. 517, 72 A.2d 348 (1950) (military service in
time of war tolled statute of limitations) ; cf. Van Heest v. Veech, 58 N.J. Super. 427,
156 A.2d 301 (1959) (military service need not be in time of war in order to suspend
statute of limitations).
4. Improper use of a countersign, misconduct as a prisoner and spying are punish-
able under the Uniform Code of Military Justice only during time of war. Uniform
Code of Military Justice, arts. 101, 105, 106, 10 U.S.C. §§ 901, 905, 906 (1970) [herein-
after cited as UCMJ].
5. Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, desertion, assaulting or willfully
disobeying a superior commissioned officer, and misbehavior of a sentinel, are punish-
able by death only during time of war. UCMJ arts. 85(c), 90, 113, 10 U.S.C. §§
885(c), 890, 913 (1970).
6. There is no statute of limitations under the Uniform Code of Military Justice
for absence without leave, aiding the enemy and desertion if they are committed during
time of war. See UCM J art. 43(a), 10 U.S.C. § 843(a) (1970). The statutes of
limitation for certain other crimes may be extended if such crimes are committed during
time of war, UCMJ art. 43(e), 10 U.S.C. §§ 843(e) (1970), or they may be suspended
for a specified period of time. UCMJ art. 43(f), 10 U.S.C. § 843(f) (1970).
7. See notes 29-30 infra & text accompanying.
8. Time of war is
when by invasion, insurrection, rebellions, or such like, the peaceable course
of justice is disturbed and stoppeI, so that the Courts be as it were, shut
up...
Skeen v. Monkeimer, 21 Ind. 1, 3 (1863) (citing Lord Coke). In re Kalanianaole, 10
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In 1800 it was held that "war" can include undeclared as well as
declared wars.' War was said to exist if Congress had authorized the
hostilities, even if it had not made a formal declaration of war." Thus,
despite the lack of formal declaration, such disparate actions as the
Hostilities Against the Indians," the Box~er Rebellion, 2 American
intervention in Mexico," and the battle between the United States and
the Philippines" were considered times of war.
It was not until the Korean conflict, however, that extensive and
long-lasting hostilities existed without a formal declaration of war. By
this time, time of war decisions had begun to increase greatly in number
and divide themselves into two categories of cases: (1) insurance
and governmental benefit cases;1" and (2) cases under the Uniform
Code of Military Justice'"
In civilian cases, the courts generally have attempted to ascertain
the intent of the parties or institutions which make use of the phrase
"time of war" in a contract or a legislative act. However, military
courts have dealt with this phrase in an often inconsistent, biased and
overreaching manner. In this area, the recently-passed War Powers
Resolution 7 potentially provides a base from which the courts can
formulate more certain and less arbitrary principles by which time of war
can be determined. This note will examine in greater detail how military
and civil courts have determined the meaning of "time of war" and will
discuss the possible impact of the War Powers Resolution on the mill-
tary's interpretation of this phrase.
TIME OF WAR IN INSURANCE AND BENEFIT CASES
One distinguishable category of cases which involves interpretation
of the term "time of war" deals with insurance policies and civil suits
for governmental benefits which are conferred for service during
Haw. 29 (1895), sustained military trials of civilians in Hawaii during periods of
insurrection. But see Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
9. Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800).
10. Id. at 41.
11. 16 Op. ATr'Y GEN. 675 (1880).
12. Hamilton v. McClaughry, 136 F. 445 (C.C. Kan. 1905).
13. Arce v. State, 83 Tex. Crim. 292, 202 S.W. 951 (1918).
14. Thomas v. United States, 39 Ct. Cl. 1 (1903). But see Newcomber v. United
States, 51 Ct. Cl. 408 (1916).
15. Such benefits may include: Civil service job preferences, Scott v. Commissioner
of Civil Service, 272 Mass. 237, 172 N.E. 218 (1930) ; certain retirement benefits for
veterans, Basbwiner v. Police & Firemen's Retirement Sys., 68 N.J. Super. 1, 171 A2d
331 (1961) ; and tax exemptions, Kaiser v. Hopkins, 6 Cal. 2d 537, 58 P.2d 1278 (1936).
16. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-935 (1970).
17. Pub. L. No. 93-148 (Nov. 7, 1973), reproduced in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS: 4064-69
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that time. Such cases are tried in civilian courts, with normal appellate
review. These courts have developed standardized ways of analyzing
and interpreting the term. As is generally true in insurance cases,
these decisions are based on what the court thinks the parties meant by
their use of the term "time of war."'". Since that intent is often am-
biguous, thie decision is usually based on the general policy of construing
insurance policies against the insurance company." Thus, the majority of
courts have found a formal declaration of war to be necessary in order
to trigger the application of a clause denying compensation for death
or damages in "time of war."2"
In the most recent decision in this. area, Pan American World
Airwiays, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.," the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York found persuasive
the maxim that whatever is not clearly excluded in all-risk insurance
policies is covered. The court held that a time of war exclusionary
clause did not clearly contemplate damage resulting from random acts
of violence by a. splinter political group, and ordered the insurance
company to pay $24,28.8,759 for a plane which was destroyed by the
.Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestind in 1970.2  The court
followed the priniciple of looking to the actual or. implied intent of. the
contracting parties;
Cases dealing with governmental benefits are handled in a similar
manner. Where a statute or regulation provides that certain benefits
will be made available to those who served in the military in time of
war, the courts examine the intent of the voters, the legislature or other
body responsible for the benefit rule, and determine whether the benefits
will be conferred in light of that intention.2' However, since the body
granting the benefit is usually governmental, the benefits are often
denied unless there has been a formal declaration of war.2" This approach
18. 13 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRAcTICE § 7386 (1943).
19. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion, 158 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1946); Jackson
v. North Am. Assur. Soc'y, 212 Va. 177, 183 S.E.2d 160 (1971).
20. Pang v. Sun Life Assur. Co., 37 Haw. 208 (1945) (Pearl Harbor); Rosenau
v. Idaho Mut. Ben. Ass'n, 65 Ida. 408, 145 F.2d 227 (1944) (Pearl Harbor); Beley v.
Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co., 373 Pa. 231, 95 A.2- 202, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 820
(1953) (Korea); Harding v. Pennsylvania Mut. Life Ins. Co., 373 Pa. 270, 95 A.2d
221, cert. denied, 346 U.S. 812 (1953) (Korea) ; Jackson v. North Am. Assur. Soc'y,
212 Va. 177, 183 S.E.2d 160 (1971) (Vietnam).
21. 368 F. Supp. 1098 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
22. Id.
23. Kaiser v. Hopkins, 6 Cal. 2d 537, 58 P.2d 1278 (1936); Bateman v. MvIarsh,
188 Misc. 189, 64 N.Y.S.2d 678 (1946).
24. Kaiser v. Hopkins, 6 Cal. 2d 537, 58 P2d 1278 (1936) (enlistment after armistice
not within time of war for tax exemption purposes); Freed v. Baldi, 166 Colo. 344, 443
P2d 716 (1968) (service during Korean conflict not in time of war for veteran's
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is based on the general legal policy that a court will be reluctant to
order ,the expenditure of public funds unless dearly mandated.25
Thus, in Kaiser v. Hopkins,2" the Supreme Court of California
determined that a soldier who enlisted and served after the armistice
was not entitled to a tax exemption because the voters intended to
exempt only those who served in time of actual war." Similarly, in
Freed v. Baldi,28 the Colorado Supreme Court held that a serviceman
who served during the Korean conflict was not entitled to veteran's
preference points because he had not served in a war officially declared
by Congress."
These cases all share the same characteristic of approaching the
interpretation of "time of war" by looking to the intent of those who
drafted the document or statute which makes that interpretation impor-
tant. As such, the decisions are grounded upon traditionally recognized
principles which may be neutrally applied.
TIME OF WAR IN MILITARY CASES
When "time of war" is interpreted in the military context, however,
the military courts take almost the opposite approach, generally failing
to consider the intent of Congress in enacting the criminal provisions
of the UCMJ.s° These cases lack a consistent method of interpretation
which makes it difficult to predict when a period will be considered
wartime. The decisions reflect a dominant concern for the needs of the
military. Moreover, these determinations are seldom overturned because
civilian courts severely restrict their appellate review of military court
decisions. Civilian review is limited to a determination of whether the
military court gave "full and fair consideration" to the issues raised. 1
This examination, however, only entails either (1) ascertaining whether
the issues were brought to the court's attention, 2 or (2) determining
preference point purposes); Scott v. Commissioner of Civil Service, 272 Mass. 237,
172 N.E. 218 (1930) (entering service after armistice signed not service in time of
war).
25. Cf. Atlantic Richfield v. Hickel, 432 F.2d 587, 592 (10th Cir. 1970).
26. 6 Cal. 2d 537, 58 P.2d 1278 (1936).
27. Id. at 539, 58 P.2d at 1279.
28. 166 Colo. 344, 443 P.2d 716 (1968).
29. Id. at 352, 443 P.2d at 720.
30. For a discussion of congressional intent see J. SNIDEKER, MILITARY JUSTICE
UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE (1953).
31. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
32. King v. Moseley, 430 F.2d 732 (10th Cir. 1970). This approach has often been
criticized. See Burris & Jones, Civilian Courts and Courts-Martal-The Civilian At-
torney's Perspective, 10 Am. CRIM. L. RE. 139 (1971); Weckstein, Federal Court
Review of Courts-Martial Proceedings: A Delicate Balance of Individual Rights and
Military Responsibility, 54 MIL. L. REv. 1 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Weckstein];
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whether the issues raised have in fact been fairly considered by the
military tribunal." Even the latter approach encompasses a narrower
range of issues than is reviewable in civilian appeals.3" Under either ap-
-proach, if the determination is affirmative, the appeal is dismissed.
Cursory review is especially unfortunate here, for the ramifications of
these decisions nay involve imprisonment or even loss of life.
The military courts, by giving increasingly broad meaning to the
phrase "time of war," have also expanded military jurisdiction over
persons who have minimal ties with tae military. Under the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, "[i]n time of war, persons serving with or
accompanying an armed force in the field" are subject to military
control.3 Prior to 1955, "in the field" had come to have a fairly ex-
panded meaning and the military was often prosecuting dependents and
civilian employees under this provision." However, the United States
Supreme Court by narrowly interpreting this provision, has limited
court-martial jurisdiction over civilians. The Court took the general view
that the military courts should have "the least possible power adequate to
the end proposed."3" The primary "end" of allowing a separate court-
martial jurisdiction was to permit the military to maintain its special
disciplinary and personnel needs in order .to adequately defend the nation. 8
Since crimes committed by civilians and dependents were punishable in
civilian courts, it was not felt that military jurisdiction was necessary
to achieve this end. 9
Developments it; the Law-Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARv. L. Rxv. 1038, 1208-36
(1970).
33. Allen v. VanCantfort, 436 F.2d 625 (1st Cir. 1971) ; Kauffman v. Secretary of
Air Force, 415 F.2d 991 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1013 (1970); Heilman
v. United States, 406 F.2d 1011 (7th Cir. 1969).
34. Compare discussion of Broussard v. Patton, 466 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 942 (1973), and notes 47-59 infra & text accompanying, with Love
v. Fitzharris, 460 F.2d 382 (9th Cir. 1972), vacated as vtwot, 409 U.S. 1100 (1973).
In Love, an earlier decision handed down the same year as Broussard, the Ninth Circuit
found unconstitutional an ex post facto reinterpretation of applicable statutes which
made the punishment greater, an action it affirmed in Broussard. The court held that
the Department of Correction, having notified a prisoner by letter that he would be
eligible for parole in three years under one interpretation of a statute, was prevented by
the ex post facto clause, U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, from reinterpreting the statute to
make the period longer, even though the Attorney General's opinion said the latter was
the correct interpretation. 460 F.2d at 384.
35. UCMJ art. 2(10), 10'U.S.C. § 802(10) (1970).
36. In Ex parte Gerlach, 247 F. 616 (S.D.N.Y. 1917), the court said, "[t]he words
'in the field' do not refer to land only, but to any place . . . where military operations
are being conducted." Id. at 617. The courts have even found that this phrase inctded
a civilian salvage worker working on an Army project in Eritrea. Perlstein v. United
States, 151 F2d 167 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. dismissed, 328 U.S. 822 (1946).
37. Anderscn v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 204, 230-31 (1821).
38. Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 138 (1953).
39. E.g., Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 246 (1960).
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Thus, the Court has held that the military has no jurisdiction over
capital crimes committed by dependents accompanying the armed forces
overseas in time of peace4" and no jurisdiction over dependents com-
mitting noncapital crimes in time of peace. 1 Nor was there court-martial
jurisdiction for capital 2 or noncapital" crimes committed by civilian
employees. Through these, and similar" decisions, the military's control
over civilians has been reduced to the point where it would seemingly
require a formal declaration of wiar by either the President4 or Congress
before dependents or civilians serving with the military would be subject
to court-martial control."
This trend has not been followed by the lower courts in determining
the applicability of the UCMJ to individuals with closer ties to the
military than dependents or civilian employees. The extent to which
the civilian courts have tolerated the military's expansion of jurisdiction
is illustrated by the recent case of Broussard v. Patton." The court there
permitted the military to retroactively define "time of war," thereby sub-
jecting soldiers who had resumed civilian life to the reimposition of mili-
tary control.
Broussard deserted October 1, 1964. On December 6,. 1967, the
Air Force advised him that they were "making nb further effort to
apprehend [him] . . . since he [was] a peacetime deserter and, as such,
the Statute of Limitations [had] expired."" The Federal Bureau of
Investigation was similarly notified. On February 7, 1969, he was in-
formed that he was again being sought because of a decision in another
case that a time of war had existed since August 1964, and therefore the
statute of limitations for peacetime desertion was tolled. Broussard was
arrested March 18, 1969. He was convicted and sentenced by the
40. Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487 (1955), rev'd on rehearing, 354 U.S. 1 (1956).
41. Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960).
42. Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960).
43. McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960).
44. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969) (no jurisdiction over nonservice
connected offenses) ; United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955) (dis-
charged soldier not subject to jurisdiction for crime committed before his discharge).
45. The President can effectuate the wartime provisions of the UCMJ through
executive order. UCMJ art. 56, 10 U.S.C. § 856 (1970).
46. See, e.g., Robb v. United States 456 F.2d 768, 771 (Ct Cl. 1972) (no juris-
diction over a civilian employee "serving with or accompanying an armed force in the
field" when war had not been formally declared by Congress, "despite the fact that the
conflict in Vietnam is a war in the popular sense of the word.") The Robb court goes
further than the Supreme Court decisions, for the latter pertained to peacetime offenses,
whereas Robb was a civilian in Vietnam with the armed forces in the 1960s. See also
Latney v. Ignatius, 416 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
47. 466 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 942 (1973).
48. Id. at 819.
440
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military courts'" and received only cursory review from the civilian
courts."" The result of these decisions was to permit the military to
retroactively declare a period a time of war so as to toll the statute of
limitation. This approach would subject to military prosecution not
only all "successful" deserters, such as Broussard, but also all soldiers
for whose crimes the statute of limitation has run. The Broussard
rationale could be extended further to include the act of a soldier which
was not criminal until the period in which the act was committed is
retroactively declared a time of war."'
This action was taken despite the fact that under its own rules the
Air Force did not 1have jurisdiction to try Broussard" and despite the
fact that the Supreme Court had held both that a discharged soldier
was not subject tQ jurisdiotion for a crime committed before his dis-
charge 3 and that the jurisdiction of a court-martial depends on the
status of the accused at the time of trial."'
This overreach of jurisdiction by the military was compounded by
the inadequate consideration given by the Court of Appeals" to
49. United States v. Broussard, 41 C.M.R. 1004 (A.F.C.M.R.), petition for review
denied, 41 C.M.R. 402 (U.S.C.M.A. 1970).
50. See note 57 infra & text accompanying.
51. For acts which become crimes only during wartime see note 4 supra.
52. The Air Force Manual provided for voluntary discharge of personnel AWOL
for more than one year, AIR FORCE MANUAL 2-69b, at 39-10 (Sept. 1, 1966), and
for compulsory discharge of AWOLs for whom the statute of limitations had run
before their return to military control. AIR FORCE MANUAL 2-69c, at 39-10 (Nov.
30, 1967). The statute of limitations for peacetime desertion is three years; for war-
time it is tolled. UCMJ art. 43, 10 U.S.C. § 843 (1970). The section in the Air Force
Manual which listed periods which were to be considered time of war for statute of
limitations purposes did not list any time during the Vietnam conflict, and stated:
If the date of absence did not occur during a wartime period . .. the airman
will be discharged . . . whether the airman was previously dropped from the
rolls as an absentee or as a deserter.
AIR FORCE MANUAL ff 2-69c, at 39-10 (Nov. 30, 1967).
This lack of jurisdiction argument was strengthened in Broussard's petition for
certiorari. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari, Broussard v. Patton, 410 U.S. 942 (1973).
Under the 1969 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, court-martial jurisdiction "ceases on
discharge from the service or other termination of that status . . . ." Id. 11. The
notification by the Air Force to Broussard, in compliance with its own rules, was
arguably "other termination" as contemplated by the Manual.
53. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 14 (1955) (court-martial
cannot base its jurisdiction on the prior status of an individual once he has been dis-
charged).
54. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969); United States ex rel. Toth v.
Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 14-15 (1955).
55. The denial of Broussard's habeas corpus petition was affirmed by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit on the ground that "the military courpt
gave 'full and fair consideration' to Broussard's claim." Broussard v. Patton, 466
F.2d 816, 818 (9th Cir. 1972). The Court of Appeals did not consider Broussard's
jurisdictional arguments. After stating that habeas corpus "is available only to guard
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Broussard's arguments and the ex post facto implications of the case." In
particular, in determining that a time of war existed in October 1964,
no consideration was given to the purposes of the provision which tolled
the statutes of limitation for acts committed in time of war," nor did
they consider whether subjecting Broussard to prosecution was necessary
or even conducive to the effectuation of any of these purposes.58  In
addition, no court addressed the question of whether the rights and
interests alleged by Broussard in his defense outweighed the military
objectives at stake.
The Court of Appeals in reaching its holding, uncritically relied
upon the decision of the Court of Military Appeals in United States v.
Anderson.5" Anderson, however, was itself based upon inadequate con-
sideration of congressional intent in providing different penalties for
crimes in wartime. Anderson was accused of deserting the Air Force in
August of 1964. The court failed to agree upon the reasons which made
the desertion "in time of war." It gave little consideration to the state of
against the military courts exceeding their jurisdiction," the court' simply took judicial
notice of the fact that the Air Force had notified Broussard that the statute of limita-
tions had run-the basis of his jurisdictional argument. See note 52 supra. This
essentially "rubber -stamp" type of review is discussed in text accompanying notes 31-34
supra.
56. Under the UCMJ, unlike civilian criminal codes, the nature, as well as the
existence of many crimes is determined by the period in which the act is committed.
See notes 4-6 supra. Desertion is one of the crimes whose nature is changed if com-
mitted during wartime. If committed during peacetime it carries a three-year .statute of
limitations, while if committed during wartime the crime becomes much more serious,
as evidenced by the tolling of the statute for it. UCMJ art. 43(f), 10 U.S.C. § 843(f)
(1970). This change indicates that desertion is not an inherently serious crime, as is
murder for example.
It is arguable that the power to declare a period as time of war for defense pur-
pGes should not rest with the military, and should have to be expressly made. How-
ever, even conceding military control, it is clear that the nature, and consequently the
penalty, of the crime cannot be changed after commission and after express declaration
of its nature by the body charged with its interpretation. A law is ex post facto if it
"changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the
crime when committed." Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798). Changing
the statute of limitations creates a punishment where none existed after a period of three
years, thereby inflicting a greater punishment. While arguably Broussard had to act
at his peril if he deserted during a period that could be considered time of war since
both contingencies are statutorily provided for, he should not be prosecuted after the
body charged with interpreting the statute, and whose ,self-interests were at stake,
has notified him that his desertion was during peacetime. Broussard was an outlaw for
the requisite three years. Congress had provided for his reentry into society, and the
military had notified him the way was clear. The Air Force should not have been
allowed to extend its jurisdiction by retroactively tolling the statute of limitations.
57. UCMJ art. 43(f), 10 U.S.C. § 843(f) (1970).
58. See generally SuBcoMm. ON TREATMENT OF DESERTERS FROM MILITARY SERVICE
OF THE SENATE COMM. ON ARMED SERVICES, 91ST CONG., 1ST SESs., TREATMENT OF
DESERTERS FROM MILITARY SERVICE 8-9 (1969).
59. 17 U.S.C.M.A. 588, 38 C.M.R. 386 (1968).
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hostilities at the time of Anderson's desertion, and primarily focused on
the nature of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution."0 One judge found that the
Resolution was an authorization, but not a formal declaration, of war.61
Another found it was not an authorization but that the President, under
his independent war-making power, had resisted the Gulf of Tonkn
attacks to an extent sufficient to equal war."2 The third judge found it
was not necessary to consider the Resolution at all because war existed
at the present time, yet failed to explain the relevance of present con-
ditions to the period of Anderson's desertion.63 There was no discussion
of congressional intent concerning tolling of the statute of limitations
during time of war. Neither was there any discussion of why, on the
facts of the case, a man whose desertion was "virtually indistinguishable
from peacetime AWOL'" 4 should be punished as if the nation were
engaged in a full-scale war. 5
The determinations of time of war in military cases such as
Broussard and Anderson, unlike the insurance and governmental benefit
cases where tlie consequences are less serious, have been made without
standardized methods or adequate appellate review. 6 The decisions, made
initially by military courts which are recognizedly biased,67 result in an
expansion of military jurisdiction permjtting the subjection of veterans,
soldiers and possibly civilians to prosecution without adequate notice' or
60. Act of August 10, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384.
61. 17 U.S.C.M.A. at 590, 38 C.M.R. at 388 (Quinn, C.J.).
62. Id. at 590-94, 38 C.M.R. at 388-92 (Killday, J.).
63. Id. at 594, 38 C.M.R. at 392 (Ferguson, J.).
64. 82 HARv. L. REv. 483, 486 (1968).
65. The statute of limitations was tolled during Worlld War I and World War
II by a congressional declaration of war. During the Korean conflict the President
suspended the statute of limitations by Exec. Order No. 10247, 3 C.F.R. 754 (Comp.
1949-1953). See also note 69 infra.
66. See note 32 supra.
67. The presiding officer at a court-martial is not a judge whose objectivity
and independence are protected by tenure and undiminishable salary and
nurtured by the judicial tradition, but is a military law officer.... [T]he sug-
gestion of the possibility of influence . . . by the officer who convenes it,
selects its members, and the counsel on both sides, and who usually has direct
command authority over its members is a pervasive one in military law ...
A court-martial . . . remains to a significant degree a -specialized part of the
overall mechanism by which military discipline is preserved.
O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 264-65 (1969); see United States ex rel. Toth v.
Ouarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955) ; Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 138 (1953).
68. It is certainly arguable that the "time of war" standard is constitutionally too
vague because "men of common intelligence must necesarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application . . . ." Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 367 (1964). See
also Note, "It Time of War" Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice: An
Elusive Standard, 67 MIcH. L. REv. 841, 850-51 (1969). This argument is supported
by the courts' inconsistent determinations of the existence of a time of war. See note 81
infra.
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sufficient consideration of their constitutional rights.
THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION
To avoid these problems, a standardized method is needed for
determining when, where and under what conditions a period will be
deemed a time of war under the UCMJ 9 The recently enacted War
Powers Resolution"° creates a mechanism which courts could rely upon
as a source of definitive and authoritative determination of time of war.
The Resolution provides that in undeclared and unauthorized war
situations, the President shall submit within 48 hours . a report,
in writing, setting forth-
(A) the circumstances necessitating the introduction of
United States Armed Forces;
(B) the constitutional and legislative authority under
which such introduction took place; and
(C) the estimated scope and duration of the hostilities or
involvement..1
Section 5(b) " further provides -that after sixty days the President shall
terminate any use of the armed forces unless Congress has declared war
or authorized the use of the forces.7" The President can extend the sixty-
day period for an additional thirty days if he
determines and certifies to Congress in writing that unavoid-
able military necessity respecting the safety of . . Forces
requires the[ir] continued use.. . . in the course of bringing
about a prompt removal of such forces."
Section 5 (c) 7" provides that the forces shall be removed at any time if
the Congress so directs by concurrent resolution. The President still
69. The "time of war" provisions can be invoked either by a declaration of war
by Congress, or by executive order under powers given to the President in article 56 of
the UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 856 (1970). In undeclared war situations, like Vietnam,
however, when neither body takes this action, it has been left to the military courts to
decide whether these provisions should apply.
70. Pub. L. No. 73-148 (Nov. 7, 1973), reproduced in 1973 U.S. CoDE CONG. &
AD. Nrws 4064-69.
71. Pub. L. No. 73-148, § 4 (Nov. 7, 1973).
72. Id. § 5(b).
73. Congress can extend the sixty day period by passing a law without either
declaring war or authorizing the use of forces. Id. § 5(b) (2). This, however, would
be at least tacit approval.
74. Id. § 5(b) (3).
75. Id. § 5(c).
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has the initiative in committing armed forces, but it is now subject
to the approval of Congress.
The situations calling for the filing of this notice"6 include all that
would reasonably call for the increased discipline and order which are
to take effect during time of war. Use of the War Powers Resolution
would protect both the military's special needs and the serviceman's inter-
est in adequate notice and definition of the area and scope of wartime
controls.77 Under this system, the military should no longer be able
to take advantage of the confusion that existed over deployment of
troops in undeclared conflicts to decide when it wished to expand its
jurisdiction and control.
Since Congress has provided for increased penalties in time of
war, the courts should look to Congress to see whether the hostilities
were authorized by it before a period would be declared wartime. Thus
the standard would hark back to. the Bas v. Tingy 78  "authorization"
76. Sec. 4(a). In the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which
United States Armed Forces are introduced-
(1) into hostilities or into .situations where imminent involvement in
hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances;
(2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation while
equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to supply,
replacement, repair, or training of such forces; or
(3) in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces
equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation;
Id. § 4. In legislative history "commitment" is described as commencing "when the
President makes the final decision to act and issues orders putting that decision into
effect." H.R. RE. No. 93-287, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
HousE REPORT]. "[H]ostilities," besides meaning situations in which fighting has already
begun, "also encompasses a state of confrontation in which no shots have been fired
but where there is a clear and present danger of armed conflict." Id. "'Imnminent
hostilities' denotes a situation in which there is a clear potential either for such a state
of confrontation or for actual armed conflict." Id.
The report then goes on to cite examples in which reporting would, or would not be
required.
A 100-percent increase in numbers of Marine guards at an embassy-say
from 5 to 10-clearly would not be an occasion for a report. . . . However,
the dispatch of 1,000 men to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, which now has a com-
plement of 4,000 would mean an increase of 25 percent, which is substantial.
Under this circumstance, President Kennedy would have been required to
report to Congress in 1962 when he raised the number of U.S. military advisers
in Vietnam from 700 to 16,000.
Id. at 8.
77. See Pub. L. No. 73-148, §§ 4(a) (3) (A), (C) (Nov. 7, 1973). Section 4(b)
provides additional opportunity for specificity:
The President shall provide such other information as the Congress may
request in the fulfillment of its constitutional responsibilities with respect to
committing the Nation to war and to the use of United States Armed Forces
abroad.
Id. § 4(b). The reports are "to the maximum extent possible . . . to be unclassified."
HousE REPORT, supra note 76, at 8.
78. 4 U.S. (4 DalI.) 37 (1800) ; see text accompanying note 10 supra.
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distinction, except that now congressional action is required. At most,
there may now be a two-month period"9 in which "time of war" will
still have to be determined by the courts. During that period the
President's reports should give the courts some aid in determining
the seriousness of the situation, and the process of reporting can be
considered some notice. Perhaps this should be a period in which
there is a presumption of peacetime for military code purposes. If the
situation is not serious enough to have prompted congressional approval
by a declaration of war or specific authorization, or disapproval by
the passage of a concurrent resolution ordering removal, or of such
little necessity that the President has not tried to gain congressional
support, then the military should not be granted the additional power.
This would conform to the Supreme Court's move to limit military juris-
diction,"0 would help solve notice and due process problems, and would
give needed consistency8 to court decisions.- The courts should now
79. There is the potential of presidential use of forces without congressional action
while the Congress is adjourned. Section 5(a) has anticipated this and provides:
If, when the report is transmitted, the Congress has adjourned sine die or
for any period in excess of three calendar days the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President pro tempore of the Senate, if they deem
it advisable (or if petitioned by at least 30 percent of the membership of their
respective Houses) shall jointly request the President to convene Congress in
order that it may consider the report and take appropriate action pursuant to
this section.
Pub. L. No. 73-148, § 5(a) (Nov. 7, 1973).
However, under the Constitution, only the President can convene Congress, and
therefore the request would not be obligatory on him or her. U.S. CONT. art II, § 3.
However, the action of the Speaker and the President pro tempore of the Senate in
requesting the convening of Congress should give sufficient indication of the seriousness
of the situation.
80. See notes 40-44 supra & text accompanying.
81. Federal, state and military courts were unable to agree whether the United
States was officially at war during the Vietnam conflict. Broussard v. Patton, 466
F2d 816 (9th Cir. 1972) ; Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 869 (1971); Mottola v. Nixon, 318 F. Supp. 538 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Robb v.
United States, 456 F.2d 768 (Ct. Cl. 1972) ; United States v. Averette, 19 U.S.C.M.A.
363, 41 C.M.R. 363 (1970) ; United States v. Anderson, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 588, 38 C.M.R.
.386 (1968); Freed v. Baldi, 166 Colo. 344, 443 P.2d 716 (1968) ; Jackson v. North An.
Assur. Soc'y, 212 Va. 177, 183 S.E.2d 160 (1971). See also Brief for Members and
Former Member of Congress as Amici Curiae at 7, 8, Broussard v. Patton, 466 F2d 816
(9th Cir. 1972).
Congress has expressed a similar dilemma. Congressional records show that there
was no accord, or general feeling that the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Act of August 10,
1964, Pub. L. No. 88-408, 78 Stat. 384, was a formal declaration of war. SENATE
CoMm. ON FORRIGN RELATIoNs, 91ST CONG., 2D SEss., DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE
WAR POWER OF CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT'S AUTHORITY AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AND
THE WAR IN INDOCHINA 105 (Comm. Print 1970).
82. Congress could better clarify the situation by requiring the President, in his
report under the War Powers Resolution, to specifically state whether the UCMJ's
increased penalties for wartime violations are needed. This would give the clearest
:'TIME OF WAR" 447
determine the existence of a time of war in light of congressional
intent demonstrated by actions taken under the War Powers Resolution.
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notice while ensuring that specific thought was given to whether these graver penalties
-were necessary.
